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Abstract 
This paper mobilizes the trajectory of privatization policies around Thessaloniki’s 
port as an entry point to explore the neoliberalization of urban infrastructure politics 
in Greece since the late 1990s. It asks how neoliberalization policies around the port 
were conceptually legitimized and traces their implications for urban infrastructure 
governance. In doing so, it draws from a reading of neoliberalism as a performative 
discourse. This understanding allows analyzing the contingent and situated 
articulation of neoliberalization discourses as well as the context-specific 
implications of neoliberalization. The paper suggests that since the late 1990s 
neoliberalization discourses in Greece were articulated with discourses of 
modernization. This coupling was mutually reinforcing for the two rationalities. On 
the one hand, successive rounds of neoliberal policies around the port were 
conceptually legitimized through functionalist references to the modern. On the 
other, performing neoliberalization constituted a key strategy in maintaining state 
legitimacy. Within such a configuration, successive failures and limitations of 
neoliberal polic(y)ing were (re-)inscribed in discourses of neoliberalization. Tracing 
the emergence and workings of this articulation in the case of Thessaloniki’s port, 
the paper also examines how successive rounds of neoliberalization consolidated, 
through failing forward, forms of governance beyond democratic accountability 
geared around consensus formation. 
Keywords: performing neoliberalization, failing forward, de-politicization, urban 
infrastructure politics, Greece 
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1 Introduction 
The continued prevalence of neoliberalism, despite its apparent de-
legitimization in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, has attracted renewed scholarly 
interest. As Wilson suggests, this interest is linked with an “uncertainty concerning 
the seemingly irrational endurance of neoliberalism in the face of all failures” (2014, 
page 301). More broadly, it poses the interrelated questions of how neoliberal 
policies legitimized in different conjunctures and what implications their prevalence 
brings about. Such questions cannot be adequately addressed in isolation from the 
“geographies of actually existing neoliberalism” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). A key 
contribution of the voluminous geographical scholarship on neoliberalism over the 
past ten years has been the shift of analytical emphasis from a rather ubiquitous 
understanding of neoliberalism to readings of neoliberalization as a geographically 
variegated, contingent and hybrid process (Brenner et al., 2010b; England and Ward, 
2007). Concerning urban neoliberalism in particular, this shift provides the ground 
for more nuanced understandings of context-specific neoliberalization processes. It 
opens up new ways to explore how neoliberalization is constructed and legitimized 
in particular urban contexts (Dikeç, 2006) “through an eclectic blend of failure and 
crisis, regulatory experimentation, and policy transfer across places, territories and 
scales” (Peck et al., 2013, page 1091).Urban infrastructures are a prominent terrain 
in and through which such processes are unfolding. The privatization of urban 
infrastructure networks is a key neoliberal orthodoxy promoted throughout the 
globe over the past four decades (Graham and Marvin, 2001). Instead of treating 
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infrastructure privatization as a homogeneous and homogenizing policy, however, 
geographical scholarship has sought “to explore the ways in which infrastructures, 
cities and nation states are produced and transformed together” (McFarlane and 
Rutherford, 2008, page 364). Here, urban infrastructure politics emerge as a 
discursive and material terrain in and through which political projects, rationalities 
and imaginaries are articulated, (new) governance and accumulation regimes are 
forged and uneven power relations are (re-)produced and contested (Graham and 
Marvin, 2001; Kaika and Swyngedouw, 2000). While not often explicitly discussed as 
urban infrastructures, ports offer an ideal entry point in analyzing “the co-evolution 
of cities and technical networks in a global context” (McFarlane and Rutherford 
2008, page 365). This is not primarily because most major ports are still located in 
cities (Hall and Jacobs, 2012)1, but more importantly because ports are key nodes in 
the socio-technical infrastructural networks that sustain urban life by supporting 
urban metabolic flows and shaping the ways in which “circulation is urbanized” 
(Cowen, 2014, page 184; Hesse, 2013; Swyngedouw, 2006). Therefore, analyzing 
transformations in port infrastructure and governance becomes central in 
understanding the (re-)weaving of the urban fabric and the changing and ever-
expanding geographies of urbanization (Shaw and Sidaway, 2010). In this, 
transnational private players like shipping lines, global terminal operators and 
logistics services providers, global infrastructure funds and financial institutions 
(Torrance, 2008) as well as transnational agreements and global standards and 
protocols (Brenner, 2004; Cowen, 2014) are entangled with local planning, labor and 
                                                          
1 As Hall and Jacobs (2012) document this is still the case despite transformations in maritime 
technologies including containerization and the rise of – often militarized – planetary logistics 
operations (Cowen, 2014). 
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environmental regulations (Cidell, 2012), political-economic actors and coalitions of 
interests as well as imaginaries and socio-cultural norms (Jaffee, 2015) in producing 
and governing port spaces. Reading port privatization policies, therefore, can unpack 
the ways in which neoliberalization is performed and legitimized in and through 
specific urban contexts. 
Against this background, this paper aims to contribute to the discussions 
around the conceptual legitimization and context-specificity of neoliberalization by 
exploring the trajectory of privatization policies around Thessaloniki’s port between 
the late 1990s and SYRIZA’s (Coalition of the Radial Left) electoral win in January 
2015. Building on a reading of neoliberalism as a performative discourse (Springer, 
2012), I suggest that analyzing the situated (re-)articulations of neoliberalization 
discourses can help us understand their conceptual legitimization. In this, I chart how 
neoliberalization discourses in Greece have been articulated with discourses of 
modernization in a mutually reinforcing coupling since the late 1990s. Besides, 
bringing Jamie Peck’s reading of neoliberalism as a failing forward process in 
dialogue with Judith Butler’s notion of performativity, I trace the effects of twenty 
years of privatization policies around Thessaloniki’s port. In doing so, I argue that 
performing neoliberalization has, through failing forward, gradually moved urban 
infrastructure governance beyond democratic accountability and depoliticized urban 
infrastructure politics. 
The paper proceeds in three steps. The first two sections sketch the 
theoretical tenets that underpin the argument focusing on neoliberalization and 
modernization discourses respectively. The following four sections briefly situate 
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Thessaloniki’s port and the major policies implemented before exploring the 
trajectory of privatization policies around Thessaloniki’s Port Authority (ThPA). The 
discussion is organized around three thematics: the coupling of modernization and 
neoliberalization discourses, the neoliberalization of urban infrastructure as a failing 
forward process and the de-politicization of urban infrastructure politics. The final 
section articulates the insights of the previous sections and returns to the questions 
of neoliberalization’s legitimization and context-specificity. The paper draws on 
eleven months of fieldwork (September 2010 – July 2011) in Thessaloniki. To chart 
the port’s transformations, I conducted in-depth expert interviews with ThPA’s 
management, shipping agents, local politicians and port workers. I also collected and 
analyzed reports and strategic plans issued by ThPA and the local and national 
government; legislation, international agreements and policy documents pertaining 
to reforms around the port; and reports from local and national media. 
2 Neoliberalization as a performative discourse: hybrid discourses, 
failing forward and the de-politicization of urban infrastructures 
Over the past twenty years an immense body of geographical work on 
neoliberalism has accumulated. And yet, as McCarthy and Prudham write “despite 
the familiarity of the concept, defining neoliberalism is no straightforward task” 
(2004, page 276). Nevertheless, we can identify, at least, four different 
understandings of neoliberalism: “as an ideological hegemonic project”, “as policy 
and program”, “as state form” and “as governmentality” (England and Ward, 2007, 
pages 11-13). Instead of confining neoliberalism to any of the above categories, 
here, I begin from Wendy Brown’s conceptualization of neoliberalism as a “market- 
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political rationality”: “a specific form of normative political reason organizing the 
political sphere, governance practices, and citizenship” (2006, page 691-693).  
This theorization foregrounds a shift of emphasis from an allegedly 
ubiquitous neoliberalism towards a conceptualization of neoliberalization as a 
“particular form of restructuring guided by [a] political rationality premised on the 
extension of market relations that privilege competition, efficiency, and economic 
success” (Dikeç, 2006, page 62). In a similar vein, Peck, Brenner and Theodore have, 
in a series of recent contributions, argued for a conceptualization of neoliberalization 
“as a variegated form of regulatory restructuring: [that] produces geo-institutional 
differentiation across places, territories and scales” (2010a, page 330). This shift 
allows for more nuanced understandings of how neoliberalization produces spaces 
while simultaneously being “produced upon and through the spaces of particular 
states and cities” (Dikeç, 2006, page 59). In other words, it calls attention to how 
neoliberalization “only ever exists in articulation with actors, institutions and 
agendas” (Castree, 2006, page 2). 
In this context, Simon Springer has recently proposed a conceptualization of 
neoliberalism as discourse: “recognized as a mutable, inconsistent, and variegated 
process that circulates through the discourses it constructs, justifies, and defends” 
(2012, page 135). This should not be understood as a mere call for linguistic analysis. 
Whilst institutional practices of regulatory development and polic(y)ing are central in 
understanding “actually existing neoliberalism” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002); such 
institutional arrangements are always inscribed in discursive constellations and are, 
thus, influenced by them. Judith Butler’s notion of discursive performativity can be 
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illuminating here. For Butler, “performativity [is] not (...) the act by which a subject 
brings into being what she/he names, but, rather, (...) that reiterative power of 
discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains” (1993, page 
3). In this line of argument, neoliberalization discourses, tend to produce the 
geographies of “actually existing neoliberalism” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002) 
through practices of “re-iteration, re-establishment and sedimentation” (Butler, 
2010, page 149). 
This has two important analytical implications for our understanding of 
neoliberalization. Firstly, as Springer suggests, it calls for particular attention to the 
“re-articulations and representations of neoliberal discourse in the form of particular 
discourses of neoliberalization, where individual actors take a proactive role in 
reshaping the formal practices of politics, policy, and administration” (2012, page, 
142). Such neoliberalization discourses, however, are always contingent and 
historico-geographically specific; they are constantly re-articulated within particular 
configurations (Laclau, 1990, pages 31-36). Hence, as Mustafa Dikeç suggests with 
regard to the neoliberalization of French urban policy, “modes of legitimization vary 
depending on established political traditions” (2006, page 78). In the French case, 
Dikeç argues, neoliberalization has, since the 1980s, been articulated with notions of 
French Republicanism in producing hybrid urban policies (2006). More recently, 
Ozan Karaman has analyzed how neoliberalization has been coupled with Islamism in 
legitimizing AKP’s urban policies in Turkey (2013).  
Secondly, understanding neoliberalism as a performative discourse allows 
understanding what Jamie Peck calls the “turgid reality of neoliberalism variously 
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failing and flailing forward” (2011, page 7). For, as Butler suggests, “performativity 
never fully achieves its effect, and so in this sense ‘fails’ all the time; its failure is 
what necessitates its reiterative temporality, and we cannot think iterability without 
failure” (2010, page 153). Or in Peck’s account of neoliberalism, its “burden—as a 
resilient, responsive and deeply reactionary credo—is that it can never remake the 
world in its own image” (2011, page 7). Therefore, insofar as performing 
neoliberalization will never lead to its pure and “idealized destination” (ibid), 
neoliberalization discourses will, time and again, be re-invented, re-articulated and 
represented on the grounds of their previous failures. On the one hand, this suggests 
that “the limits of earlier forms of neoliberalization” (Peck, 2011, page 6) will be re-
inscribed in discourses of neoliberalization and further rounds of neoliberal 
experimentation. On the other, it highlights that neoliberalization is a cumulative 
process of market-oriented regulatory restructuring (Brenner et al., 2010b) that 
proceeds as a paradoxical “process that achieves its effects in both regenerative and 
accumulative ways” (Butler, 2010, page 149). 
In this setting, it is important to note that a fundamental transformation that 
successive rounds of neoliberalization have brought about is the articulation of 
processes of de-politicization and governance reorganization (Mouffe, 2005, 
Rancière, 1999, Swyngedouw, 2011). In Disagreement, Jacques Rancière, argues that 
the “reigning idyll” in contemporary European democracies is “consensus 
democracy” (1999, page 102). That is “a government practice and conceptual 
legitimization” that seeks to “evacuate politics” and democratic disagreement, 
reducing society to “the sole interplay of state mechanisms and combinations of 
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social energies and interests” (1999, page 101-102). For Rancière, de-politicization 
has both an institutional and a discursive dimension. Concerning the latter, as 
Chantal Mouffe argues, neoliberalization discourses are marked by an identification 
of democracy with “actually existing liberal democratic capitalism” (1993, page 10), 
leading to an often “outright identification of democratic form with the necessities 
of global capital” (Stavrakakis, 2007, page 264). To put it in Rancière words: “the 
absolute identification of politics with the management of capital is no longer the 
shameful secret hidden behind the ‘forms’ of democracy; it is the openly declared 
truth by which our governments acquire legitimacy” (1999, page 113). 
Concerning the former, geographical research over the past twenty years has 
documented the consolidation of networked governing arrangements that bring 
together the state, market and civil society actors at a variety of interlinked spatial 
scales (Brenner, 2004; Swyngedouw, 2005). Urban infrastructure networks and 
projects are paradigmatic of this new mode of “governance-beyond-the-state” 
(Swyngedouw, 2005): [t]hey fuse together actors, elites, and institutions not only 
from the local social milieu, but also from the national or international level” 
(Swyngedouw, 2009, pages 55-57). Together with the outright privatization of urban 
infrastructure networks, such governance arrangements tend to overemphasize the 
role of policy-making, administrative and managerial aspects. A vast techno-
managerial and expert apparatus is proliferating, embedded within variably 
neoliberal regimes of polity (Mouffe, 2005, Swyngedouw, 2011). This amounts to 
“the growth of a managerial approach to government: government is reconceived as 
a managerial function, deprived of its proper political dimension” (Žižek, 2002, page 
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303). Furthermore, such networks and expert agents often operate in what Maarten 
Hajer calls an “institutional void” (2003). The inclusion or exclusion of actors and the 
accountability of these networked arrangements “often take place in non-
transparent, ad hoc, and context-dependent ways and differ greatly from those 
associated with egalitarian pluralist democratic rules and codes” (Swyngedouw, 
2009, page 57). Consequently, policy-making and urban governance are increasingly 
slipping away from democratic accountability and political control consolidating “the 
political powers of authorities who are not accountable (experts, judges, 
committees)” (Rancière, 1999: 97). 
This being said, “global trends are differentially experienced, and take place 
in different contexts of fragmentation of networked infrastructures in different parts 
of the world” (McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008, page 365). Infrastructure production 
and management take quite distinct forms in different urban contexts. The 
remainder of this paper traces these dynamics through the trajectory of 
Thessaloniki’s port. Before doing so, however, it briefly explores the meaning of 
discourses around ‘the modern’ in contemporary Greece as it was through their 
coupling with neoliberalization discourses that privatization policies were promoted. 
3 Unpacking modernization discourses in contemporary Greece (1990s-
2010s) 
As with neoliberalism, I do not understand modernization as a coherent and 
fully-formed political project. Rather, I read modernization as a discourse that seeks 
to narrate all aspects of life (political, economic, cultural etc) along the dichotomy 
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between the ‘old’ and the ‘modern’. In this paper, I am specifically concerned with 
the particular forms that modernization discourses took in Greece since the 1990s. 
While modernization discourses were diffused in the Greek political 
landscape throughout the post-dictatorship period (post-1974), modernization 
emerged as a key political discourse in the early 1990s. September 1996 marked a 
radical turning point. PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) under the leadership 
of Costas Simitis won the national elections and renewed its term. Simitis’ PASOK, 
however, was significantly different from the populist centre-left party established 
by Andreas Papandreou in 1974. Between 1996 and 2004 PASOK’s political agenda 
was articulated around the notion of modernization («εκσυγχρονισμός»). 
Modernization ideas, however, were by no means restricted in supporters of PASOK 
finding large appeal both within conservative New Democracy (ND) and the left 
(Tsakalotos, 2010). Simitis’ electoral wins in 1996 and 2000 signified the hegemony 
of modernization discourses during the period. The ascent of ND to government in 
2004 did not significantly alter the discursive coordinates. ND’s “re-establishment of 
the state” campaign, under Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis, did not question the 
core of modernization discourses but on the contrary criticized PASOK for failing to 
effectively implement the accompanying policies. Greece has, since the late 1990s, 
been witnessing the “confluence of the mainstream centre-right and centre-left 
parties on a liberal-modernizing agenda” (Kioupkiolis, 2014, page 145). 
The thrust of modernization discourses was that because of its historico-
geographical particularities Greece has not followed the capitalist development 
trajectory of its European counterparts. An oversized, inefficient and clientelist state, 
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a weak civil society and severe inadequacies in major infrastructures were hindering 
the country’s development. Simitis’ inaugural parliamentary speech summarized the 
way forward as building “a modern, strong Greece [through] the equal participation 
of the country in European integration (…) the development of a competitive and 
dynamic economy, (…) the modernization of the State and the country” (Hellenic 
Parliament, 1996, no page). “Strong Greece”, “Europeanization” and “development” 
were the nodal points for modernization discourses,  symbolically condensed in two 
key aims: Eurozone membership; and the organization of the 2004 Athens Olympic 
Games. In the following years, urban large-scale infrastructure networks became the 
“semiotic and aesthetic vehicles” (Larkin, 2013, page 329) sustaining the fantasy of 
“Strong Greece”.  As the infrastructures for the Olympics were built and major 
highways across the country were constructed, a functionalist and performative 
understanding of urban politics was articulated wherein: “every tangible and 
imposing result (…) efface[d] from the [political] map questions over its objectives, 
uses, beneficiaries or the processes followed for its attainment” (Sevastakis, 2004, 
page 100). 
Part and parcel with the alluring fantasy of “Strong Greece”, modernization 
discourses also constructed their ‘Other’. Perhaps the most influential account in this 
respect is Nikiforos Diamandouros’ “cultural dualism” thesis. Drawing heavily from 
structural functionalist and linear modernization theories prevalent in the U.S. in the 
1950s and 1960s, Diamandouros argued that the introduction of modern Western 
institutions in Greece led to “intense social, political, and cultural struggles” between 
potential losers and beneficiaries resulting in two distinct cultural camps that ensued 
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in post-dictatorship Greece: the “underdogs” and the “modernizers” (1994, page 8). 
Whereas the former is entrenched “among the very extensive, traditional, more 
introverted, and least competitive strata and sectors of Greek society” the latter 
“draws its intellectual origins from the Enlightenment … [is] secular and extrovert in 
orientation” and adheres to a modernization project (Diamandouros, 1994, page 17). 
The “underdog culture” is further characterized by a “deep lack of faith (…) towards 
capitalism and the workings of the market” (Diamantouros, 2000, page 80). This 
dualist logic, however, builds on a Eurocentric logic downplaying the complexity of 
different development trajectories (Tziovas, 1995).A linear, evolutionary and 
economistic logic marks modernization discourses reducing the complexities, 
struggles and contradictions of the transition to modern capitalist economies in 
Europe to a homogeneous pattern (Demertzis, 1997). 
4 Situating Thessaloniki’s port privatization policies (1990s-2010s) 
Thessaloniki’s port is the second biggest port in Greece and the major 
gateway port for the southern Balkan area.  It is located on the Orient-East Med Core 
Network Corridor of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) and is a node in 
the Pan-European Corridors IV and X. The port serves the domestic market of 
Thessaloniki and Northern Greece as well as a wider and internationally contested 
hinterland in the Balkan Peninsula, predominantly southern Serbia, Macedonia and 
south-western Bulgaria (ThPA, 2017).  
By the mid-1990s Thessaloniki’s port was at a turning point. On the one hand, 
the collapse of the socialist regimes and the subsequent integration of the Balkan 
economies in globalized capital and goods flows signalled the gradual revitalization 
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of the links between the port and its Balkan hinterland. On the other, 
transformations in maritime technology since the 1970s, including containerization, 
new port technologies and changes in the size of ships were putting significant 
pressure on the port’s infrastructure exacerbated by its limited land. The completion 
of the construction of the port’s container terminal in 1989 and the westward 
expansion of its infrastructure were significant, albeit inadequate, improvements in 
dealing with these pressures. As industries from Thessaloniki were relocating to the 
Balkans and Greek and international capital flows were reopening the derelict Balkan 
industries (Labrianidis, 2011), the port witnessed significant increases in dry bulk 
cargo traffic (mainly coal and ores) reaching a peak of 4.6m tones in 2007 as well as 
in container traffic leading to a peak of 447,221 TEUs handled by the port in 2007 (a 
167% increase compared to 1997) (ThPA, 2008a). Nevertheless, Thessaloniki’s port 
was also beginning to face increasing competition from neighbouring ports (Burgas 
and Varna in Bulgaria, Durres in Albania, Bar in Montenegro and Adriatic Sea ports) 
that were claiming part of the transports in its contested hinterland. Therefore, for 
Thessaloniki’s political elite improving the port’s infrastructure and hinterland 
connections was “essential” for “the metropolitan role that the city want[ed] to play 
in the Balkans” (Municipality of Thessaloniki, 2005, page 125). Pressures towards this 
direction were also exerted from the city’s economic elite – represented by the 
Union of Industrialists of Northern Greece (SVVE) and Thessaloniki’s Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (EVETH) – in order to serve its vested interests in the 
Balkans. 
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In this context and throughout the past two decades, Thessaloniki’s port 
would become the terrain for successive rounds of neoliberal experimentation. In 
this paper, I focus on the three most prominent experiments as key moments of re-
articulation of the discursive and political coordinates. First, the quasi-privatization 
of ThPA introduced by PASOK’s government in 1999 (Law 2688/99). Second, ND’s 
efforts to privatize the port’s container terminal in 2008 (Law 3654/2008), resulting 
in a temporary but ultimately failed concession agreement between ThPA and the 
Hutchinson-Alapis consortium. Finally, the enlisting of ThPA as one of the assets to 
be privatized as part of the loan agreement between Greece and its creditors2 (Law 
3986/2011, Law 4092/2012), that has not, up until SYRIZA’s election in 2015, been 
fulfilled. In the remainder of this paper I analyze this trajectory organized around 
three thematics: the coupling of modernization and neoliberalization discourses, the 
sedimented results of ‘failed’ neoliberal experiments, and the de-politicization of 
urban infrastructure politics. 
5 Neoliberalization as Modernization and the privatization of ThPA 
ThPA was first inscribed in neoliberalization discourses through the European 
Convergence Programme designed by the Minister of Finance Yannos Papantoniou 
in 1997. That year the Greek public deficit was at 4% and the public debt at 109.5% 
of the GDP (Eurostat, 2002), both being well-above the Maastricht criteria. 
Consequently, the centrality of joining the Eurozone in modernization discourses 
posited public deficit and debt reduction as the primary objectives of PASOK’s 
economic policy and as synonymous to good governance. For Papantoniou, a key 
                                                          
2 European Union (EU), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Central Bank (ECB) 
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way to achieve these objectives was the privatization of various public infrastructure 
companies including telecommunication networks, power infrastructure, local water 
services, airports and ports. From its very conception ThPA’s privatization was 
knitted together with the country’s integration in the Eurozone in both public and 
policy discourses (Pallis, 2006).  
Hand in glove with the Eurozone fiscal rules, the progressive privatization of 
infrastructure monopolies also had the active support of the European Commission 
(EC) (Plaskovitis, 2000). Whilst recognizing the Mediterranean region as one of 
“great complexity and contrasts”, in its 1997 Green paper on Sea Ports and Maritime 
Infrastructures, the EC cites “current economic considerations” and “a noticeable 
shift in attitude regarding the function and role of ports” (CEU, 1997, page 12) to 
argue that “the introduction of market principles in infrastructure works, (…), would 
be the most effective remedy to avoid the risk of creating wasteful overcapacity and 
possible distortions of trade flows between Member States” (CEU, 1997, page 14). In 
the following years, while a multiplicity of institutional configurations were 
established in member states, involving local and national state at different degrees, 
the assumption that the privatization and liberalization of port infrastructures will 
increase their competitiveness and efficiency remained the cornerstone of EU policy-
orientations (CEU, 2004). 
This is not, however, to suggest that ThPA’s privatization was imposed on 
Greece by the EU. In the late 1990s, ThPA was characterized by “insensitivity 
towards users’ demands, absence of port facilities and inland connections, (…) [and] 
lack of investment (…)” (Pallis, 2006, page 156). Building on these existing problems, 
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modernizers eagerly argued that the public port authority was fundamentally 
“anachronistic and inadequate” as opposed to the “modern alternative” of 
privatization, “market rationality and economic efficiency” (Christofilopoulou, 1998, 
page 62). Port modernization was, thus, equated with neoliberal orthodoxies around 
privatization that would allow the introduction of “new technologies and 
organizational structures” and “attract high-yield investments” (Pallis, 2006, page 
158). Hence, adopting a strikingly similar language to that of the EC, the law 
introducing ThPA’s privatization in 1999 (Law 2688/99) explained how the reform 
sought to “facilitate the adjustment of the sector to contemporary trends, (…) 
overcome the deficiencies of the pre-existing port structures” (Hellenic Republic, 
1999, no page) and promote “the greatest possible private participation in the 
provision of port services” (Ministry of Mercantile Marine, 2002, page 7). 
Thessaloniki’s integration in global transportation networks, so the argument went, 
would necessitate ThPA’s privatization (Hellenic Republic, 1999) and IMF’s and EU’s 
strong support for reform were repeatedly cited as proof of that (Politis, 1998, 
1999). 
Attracting private capital, then, was seen as a modernizing force that would 
help ThPA deal with “the rapidly developing increase in competition (…) from 
terminals in the wider region” (ThPA, 2007, page 68) and facilitate its transition from 
a marginal secondary EU port to an integral part of the EU’s maritime transport 
networks. Seven years after PASOK’s quasi-privatization reform, ND’s newly elected 
government sought to legitimize the privatization of ThPA’s container terminal in 
almost identical terms. For ND, Thessaloniki’s port needed “to adapt to international 
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standards and modern trade and transport needs, which necessitate the introduction 
of capital and expertise from the private sector” (Hellenic Republic, 2008, page 12, 
my emphasis). Hutchinson, as a major player in the global container terminal market, 
and Alapis’ CEO and major shareholder Lavrentis Lavrentiadis, as a successful Greek 
investor, were the ‘heroes’ that were to bring forward the necessary modernization. 
Lavrentiadis, in particular, was at the time attracting the interest of Greek and 
foreign media as a “success story” and a “big player” (Hope, 2009; Sokou, 2006). He 
was an entrepreneur who “ha[d] the passion required” to deal with the “everyday 
adventure” of doing business in the “unstable institutional environment, 
bureaucracy and corruption that dominates Greek economy” (Sokou, 2006, no page) 
and whose involvement in the privatization of the container terminal would 
“increase the earnings for all stakeholders and especially (…) ThPA” (Lavrentiadis, 
2008, no page). And yet, these ‘modernization heroes’ had to deal with the 
“romantics and fundamentalists” resisting the privatization policy as they were 
“unable to understand the givens of modern infrastructure management” (Hellenic 
Parliament, 2008, no page). The concession of the container terminal to Hutchison-
Alapis, however, was not cancelled by these “romantics and fundamentalists” but by 
the 2008 financial crisis that led to the withdrawal of the consortium’s offer. 
Only three years after Hutchinson-Alapis’ withdrawal ThPA would become 
inscribed into a third wave of neoliberalization policies, this time as part of the 
bailout agreement between Greece and its creditors. The advent of the Greek debt 
crisis, however, would bring about a reorganization of the discursive coordinates. 
Overnight the rhetoric of success and the strong modernizing Greece gave its place 
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to discourses of failure, catastrophe and national salvation (Stavrakakis, 2013). The 
symptom of Greece’s failure was the accumulation of debt. Debt, however, as 
Stavrakakis suggests, was also the nodal point in the articulation of a discursive 
operation “creating and sustaining shame and guilt and thus legitimising 
punishment” (2013, page 315). For neoliberal modernizers the underlying cause of 
debt, as a symptom of failure, was the “Greek exceptionalism” (Tsakalotos, 2010). 
Greek exceptionalism, so the argument went, consisted of trying to “become Europe 
without [adopting] truly European attitudes in the economic, political and cultural 
domains” as Kostis Hatzidakis, ND’s Minister between 2007 and 2009, put it (2012, 
no page). The prime reason for this was the prevalence of “political clientelism 
(…)and the (…) effort to avoid political cost” that over time proved to be stronger 
“than the efforts for (…) modernization of the state and society” (Simitis, 2010, no 
page). 
The remedy, then, was a further round of ‘modern’ neoliberalization policies. 
ThPA’s privatization was dictated by the necessity “to significantly reduce public 
debt” (Hellenic Parliament, 2010, page 48). Most importantly, however, for PASOK’s 
Minister of Finance in 2010, George Papakonstantinou, it was a policy followed 
across the globe “[where] governments are attempting to exploit and utilize public 
property in favor of a restructuring of the economy and the introduction of private 
capital, which helps productivity and competitiveness; helps providing improved 
services to citizens” (Hellenic Parliament, 2010, page 47).  
Effectively, the coupling of modernization and neoliberalization discourses 
has been the prevalent strategy in legitimizing the three rounds of privatization 
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policies around ThPA. During the late 1990s and the 2000s, this coupling revolved 
around the fantasy of the ‘strong Greece’ that was becoming a modern European 
country. The same coupling was mobilized since the outbreak of the crisis, only this 
time the rhetoric of ‘success story’ has given its place to notions of punishment for 
not becoming modern/European, meaning not neoliberal, enough. 
6 Failing forward neoliberalization: tracing the effects of 20 years of 
neoliberal policies around Thessaloniki’s port 
The fact that ThPA has not been fully privatized does not mean that the port 
did not undergo a neoliberal restructuring. This section describes how the 
implemented policies have gradually consolidated a neoliberal rationality around the 
port’s governance whilst failing to achieve their declared full-privatization aim. As 
already noted, the port’s neoliberal restructuring began with the first wave of 
privatization reforms in 1999. The initial privatization plan, designed by the Bank of 
America, foresaw the unbundling of ThPA’s activities and their concession to private 
capital(s) (Politis, 1999; see Graham and Marvin, 2001). However, Simitis’ 
government promoted a quasi-privatization policy through the corporatization of 
ThPA to ameliorate public opposition to the privatization and minimize political 
costs. The private enterprise ThPA SA was established and acquired “the exclusive 
right to use and exploit the land, buildings and facilities of Thessaloniki’s Port 
Terrestrial Zone” (Hellenic Republic, 1999, page 611). Yet, the Greek state remained 
the sole shareholder of the company. ThPA’s quasi-privatization was consolidated in 
July 2001, when the Inter-ministerial Privatization Committee decided the listing of 
25.73% of ThPA’s shares on Athens Stock Exchange. Together with the €16 million 
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that it brought to the state coffer (Ta Nea, 2001), the decision also aimed to 
strengthen investors’ interest in Athens Stock Exchange. PASOK’s governments 
actively encouraged ‘the markets’ and small investors to invest in the ‘blue chips’ of 
quasi-privatized infrastructure networks during the 1997-2002 Athens Stock 
Exchange boom. The listing of ThPA, together with a series of other infrastructure 
and utility networks, served PASOK’s central goal of consolidating financial markets 
and the banking sector (Stathakis, 2010). 
The two reforms introduced a radical shift around ThPA’s governance. 
Henceforth, ThPA SA was to operate “towards profit-maximization within the market 
economy” (ThPA, 2004, page 10). Moreover, as a result of its listing on Athens Stock 
Exchange, ThPA’s land and infrastructure began to be continuously assessed using 
financial criteria. Consequently, financial assessment and market efficiency were 
instituted as the governing principles around the port. And yet, as the Greek State 
remained ThPA’s major shareholder (74.13%), the Minister of Mercantile Marine 
maintained the privilege to appoint the organization’s manager (ThPA, 2004). As 
similar models were introduced in many quasi-privatized utility companies, a quite 
paradoxical logic of state entrepreneurialism was consolidated accompanied by the 
formation of a state-appointed techno-managerial elite (Sevastakis, 2004). 
Compared to the neoliberal archetype of full-scale privatization the first wave of 
state-led neoliberalization around the port was a failure. Nevertheless, it resulted in 
a configuration wherein the new techno-managerial elite in close cooperation with 
the political elite, were following the market logic. 
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The 1999 reform paved the way for the second wave of neoliberalization 
revolving around the efforts to privatize ThPA’s container terminal between 2006 
and 2008. This time, it was ND’s government that announced its intention to attract 
“giga-investments through the concession of activities” to global terminal operators 
(Macedonian Press Agency, 2006, no page). Besides, anticipating the government’s 
policies (and operating within market criteria), ThPA’s strategic investment plan 
foresaw that “the necessary expansion of its container terminal out to sea” would 
materialize through its “imminent privatization” (2005, page 1). In January 2008 
ThPA issued an international call for tenders for the container terminal (ThPA, 
2008b). Three global container terminal operators – Hutchison Port Holdings, Cosco 
Pacific and Dubai Port World – responded to the call. Except from Cosco, global 
operators were collaborating with Greek investment and infrastructure funds. 
Hutchison cooperated with Lavrentis Lavrentiadis’ Alapis SA pharmaceutical 
company and Dubai Port World with Piraeus Bank and the largest Greek construction 
company Aktor SA. Hutchison-Alapis offered a guaranteed total amount of €419.5 
million, 2.5 times the fee offered by Cosco and 7 times the fee offered by Dubai Port 
World consortium (ThPA, 2008c). In July 2008, ThPA announced a temporary 
agreement with Hutchison-Alapis. However, in December 2008, the consortium 
withdrew its interest. In a laconic statement ThPA’s chairman, Lazaros Kanavouras, 
attributed the development to the outbreak of the financial crisis (Imerisia, 2008). In 
parallel, a series of media publications – citing ThPA executives who wished to 
remain anonymous – argued that the ultimately failed negotiations between the 
stakeholders involved a fundamental renegotiation of the terms of the agreement as 
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the consortium was facing difficulties in securing funding for the expansion of the 
container terminal out to sea (Kalli, 2008; Lampropoulos, 2008). 
After the consortium’s withdrawal it became apparent that the fee offered, 
for a secondary European port like Thessaloniki, was speculatively high. Speculative 
investments were the decisive factor for the future of ThPA’s container terminal. 
While speculative offers were the rule in container terminal operation market at the 
time3, Alapis’ involvement calls for further attention. Speculative investments were 
central in Alapis’ owner meteoric career. Adopting an aggressive strategy of mergers 
and acquisitions in a context of deregulated financial markets, Lavrentiadis 
effectively transformed his pharmaceutical company into a hedge fund. For Alapis 
the involvement in the port deal aimed at “the effective short-term financial 
leverage of investment funds” (Alapis SA, 2008b, no page, my emphasis). Indeed, the 
announcement of the temporary agreement with ThPA was followed by a round of 
capital share increase and the issuing of a €300 million convertible bond loan (Alapis 
SA, 2008a). Two years after the concession agreement’s failure, Alapis filed a request 
for bankruptcy facing severe problems in serving the loans that supported 
Lavrentiadis’ aggressive speculative practices (To Vima, 2011). In the meantime, 
Lavrentiadis had expanded his activities in banking by acquiring 31.5% of the small 
Greek Proton Bank from Piraeus Bank for €70.7 million in late 2009 (Papachristou, 
2009). According to the Bank of Greece auditors, in 2010 and 2011 Proton Bank 
issued loans of €701 million to companies connected with Lavrentiadis, including 
                                                          
3 The guaranteed fee for the concession was approximately 21 times the earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) for the whole of ThPA’s activities in 2007 amounting to 
€19.9 million (ThPA, 2008a). Notteboom and Rodrigue estimate that a series of deals were made at 
prices 15 to 25 times the EBITDA of the terminals between 2000 and 2007 (2012). 
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Alapis, with little or no collaterals, no business plans and within a few days from the 
request (Papadakou, 2011; Reuters, 2012). However, in July 2011, while still under 
investigation, Proton Bank received €100 million of state funds in the name of the 
financial sector’s stability. In a parliamentary speech, PASOK’s Minister of Finance 
Evangelos Venizelos explicated his rationale: 
“Think logically and responsibly (…) Is it possible for the Greek 
state to believe (…) [that] a legally operating bank is insolvent? 
(…) All our banks are solvent because they are supported by the 
Greek government, the Bank of Greece and the European Central 
Bank.” (Hellenic Parliament, 2011, pages 207-208, my emphasis). 
While draconian austerity measures were imposed on the majority of the 
population, the costs of Lavrentiadis’ failed speculative moves were eagerly covered 
by the Greek state. Lavrentiadis’ case, however, is not an exception of corrupt 
practices. Rather, it exemplifies a dominant way through which political and 
economic elites in Greece were (re-)produced and closely articulated over the past 
twenty years. The 1999 quasi-privatization reforms transformed urban infrastructure 
spaces into prominent terrains for speculative moves. Tycoons, who benefitted from 
the deregulation of the financial and especially the banking sector, in cooperation 
with global capital, attempted to boost their profits through speculative investments 
and political links. 
And yet, the failure of the concession agreement did not challenge the 
dominance of privatization policies. In a 2013 special issue of the journal Port.Thess 
– published by ThPA – SVVE and EVETH, representing the city’s economic elite, and 
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local politicians also concurred on the urgency of the privatization process as well as 
on the importance of attracting specialized infrastructure capital (Port.Thess, 2013). 
7 Consensual infrastructure politics and the de-politicization of 
Thessaloniki’s port privatization 
 While scholarly debates around de-politicization have acquired centrality in 
Greece since the outbreak of the crisis, its emergence and consolidation around 
infrastructure politics can be traced back to the late 1990s. This section unearths the 
discursive and institutional reconfigurations that have sought to gradually 
depoliticize infrastructure politics over the past three decades. 
The first steps towards this direction can, again, be traced back to the 1999 
privatization reform. Perhaps the most important corollary of the coupling of 
modernization and neoliberalization discourses has been the silencing of political 
questions around urban infrastructure politics. As soon as privatization was 
identified with the only viable modern alternative in hegemonic discourses, the 
articulation of alternative imaginaries was forestalled. “To search for and experiment 
with ‘alternative’ roads for development” is a characteristic of the underdog culture 
in late development societies (2000, page 54), Diamandouros argued; bringing to 
mind Alain Badiou’s comment that “modernization is the name for a strict and 
servile definition of the possible” (2008, page 50). For modernizers, following the 
market logic was not a political choice but exhausted the universe of the possible. 
Hence, according to the 1999 concession agreement between the Greek state and 
ThPA, the port was to be led by “neutral experts” (ThPA, 2006, page 10) on the basis 
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of “non-political” market criteria (ThPA, 2006, page 10). The agreement can, thus, be 
seen as an institutionalization in the form of law of what Pierre Bourdieu calls the 
‘de-politicization of the economic’ (2002). In parallel, the ‘outsourcing’ of ThPA’s 
activities together with the still prominent role of the state “render[ed] the 
boundary between public and private organizations permeable” (Stoker, 1998, page 
38). The quasi-private/quasi-public ThPA became part of the plethora of 
stakeholders involved in “achieving the broad consensus of representatives of the 
private, public and social sector of the city to create a common development vision” 
(Municipality of Thessaloniki, 2005, page 493). The act of governing the urban was 
gradually being reconfigured to an art of consensus building between – competing 
but cooperating – stakeholder interests.  
The negotiations around the privatization of ThPA’s container terminal 
provide a prominent example in this respect. For ND’s government and ThPA’s 
management the privatization of the container terminal was an exercise in 
consensus building (ThPA, 2007). Consensus, however, was to be achieved within the 
already defined aim of privatization that was constructed as a solution promoting 
the “‘general interest of the people’ [and] whose implementation [would] overcome 
the winners/losers form of resolution of conflicts” (Mouffe, 2005, page 14). Despite 
the allegedly inclusive character of the institutional framework around the port’s 
management, however, exclusion borders were drawn when the inevitability of the 
privatization was questioned. To begin with, the workers’ representatives sitting in 
ThPA’s board and a host of parliament members that disagreed with the 
privatization of the terminal were impeded from participating in the board meeting 
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that was to formulate the call for bids for the terminal (Interview, Port Worker, 
11/2010). More importantly, discursive exclusion borders were also drawn around 
the workers’ industrial action against the concession of the terminal. Already from 
the first month of industrial action, local and national newspapers portrayed an 
apocalyptic image concerning the consequences of the strike, with titles like: “Port 
strike brings the market to its knees” (Koutsamparis, 2008) and “The strike in ThPA 
sinks businesses” (Mathiopoulou, 2008). For neoliberal modernizers, the striking port 
workers were a privileged minority stubbornly “adopting a narrow-minded stance 
ignoring the interests of the organization” (Interview, ThPA management, 05/2011) 
and “holding [Thessaloniki’s] entire society to ransom” as, Yiorgos Mylonas, 
President of SVVE, put it (2008, page 3). In this context, political antagonism was not 
eradicated but rather slept into the category of moralistic and legalistic discourses 
(Mouffe, 2005, Stavrakakis, 2007). Eventually, the conflict around workers’ industrial 
action would dominate the agenda around the concession of the container terminal 
overshadowing political questions over public infrastructure management, 
environmental regulation and labor rights. 
Besides, for neoliberal modernizers these questions were not to be publicly 
debated, but privately and consensually negotiated between ThPA, the Greek state 
and Hutchinson-Alapis. The call for bids for the container terminal had already 
reduced politics around the port into private negotiations. Details over the 
governance of the terminal, including working conditions and environmental 
regulations as well as its expansion out to sea, were to be consensually agreed 
between ThPA and Hutchison-Alapis (ThPA, 2008d). International research on such 
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negotiations and deals has documented how they shift urban infrastructure 
governance towards market mechanisms as private actors create governance rules 
and regimes in co-operation and interaction with the state (Torrance, 2008). Whilst 
in Thessaloniki these negotiations ultimately failed, what remains important is that 
they happened at a distance from both the public and the port’s workers. 
Arguably, however, the de-politicization of urban infrastructure politics 
reached its climax during the third wave of privatization policies. The primary ground 
for conceptually legitimizing the dogmatic neoliberal policies that accompanied the 
bailout agreement was the seriousness and urgency of the country’s condition. As 
early as December 2009, Prime Minister, Yiorgos Papandreou, effectively 
summarized the logic proclaiming that “our homeland is in the ER (…) [w]e shall 
never forget the words of Andreas Papandreou ‘we will either eliminate debt or debt 
will annihilate the country’” (2009, no page). In hegemonic discourses metaphors of 
sickness were coupled by apocalyptic narratives in the event of the country declaring 
bankruptcy. A “state of permanent economic emergency” (Žižek, 2010, page 85) 
was, thus, constructed through the cultivation of fear (Douzinas, 2013). For 
Thessaloniki’s port, in particular, the urgency of the privatization was further 
exacerbated by the failure of the concession agreement in 2008. As ThPA’s CEO, 
Stylianos Angeloudis, put it: “if the process of exploitation of the port (…) is not 
carried forward immediately, the port of Thessaloniki will in the next 7 years become 
a small regional port” (Kathimerini, 2013, no page).  
The urgency of the situation was such that there was no time and room for 
politics, disagreement and democratic governance. The trajectory of the design and 
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implementation of the privatizations scheme accompanying the bailout agreement is 
marked by a reduction of politics to negotiations between experts, strictly limited 
public information and minimal compliance with the formal envelope of democracy. 
To begin with, the details of the privatization scheme, as of the entire structural 
adjustment programme, were negotiated in private meetings between EU-IMF-ECB 
technocrats and successive Greek governments. Despite their centrality in the 
formulation of politics, however, such discussions were reduced to a tightly 
controlled spectacle foreclosing the information available to the public (Douzinas, 
2013).  
Yet, even these private meetings were too political for the creditors. 
Consequently, the Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund (HRADF) was 
institutionalized, in July 2011, in order to “restrict governmental intervention in the 
privatization process” (HRADF, 2011a, no page). The HRADF acquired all of the state 
assets that were to be privatized. According to the EC, its institutionalization was 
essential in managing the privatization process through “an independent and 
depoliticized board of directors and an advisory board (…) to benefit from 
international experience and technical expertise” (2011, pages 30-31). The HRADF is 
administered by a government appointed six-member Board of Directors comprising 
of “[i]ndividuals of wide acclaim, scientific training and professional proficiency and 
reliability with a high level of know-how (…) in business administration (…), in 
financial sector activities or in real estate development and management” (Hellenic 
Republic, 2011a, pages 3227-3228). Similar criteria inform the appointment of two 
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members by Eurozone countries and the EC as well as of a Council of Experts that 
provides further techno-managerial expertise (ibid). 
In this context, HRADF’s first step towards the exploitation of ThPA was the 
appointment of further expert consultancy services to explore options around “the 
exploitation of the ports infrastructure via concessions of parts or groups of ports 
operations or via share sale” (HRADF, 2012, page 33). More specifically, Morgan 
Stanley and Piraeus Bank were appointed as financial advisors, Alexiou-Kosmopoulos 
Law firms and Freshfields as legal advisors and HPC Hamburg and Marnet as 
technical advisors (HRADF, 2011b). The initial suggestions of the expert consultants 
around ThPA were discussed during a private meeting between the representatives 
of the HRADF and members of Thessaloniki’s politico-economic elite – including 
mayor Yannis Boutaris, ThPA’s CEO Stylianos Angeloudis and the president’s of SVVE 
and EVETH – in May 2012 (Mitrakis, 2012). Similar meetings and consultations 
occurred in the following three years. Discussions in these meetings revolved around 
the preferred method of privatization for the port. Despite the mobilization of expert 
knowledge and the depoliticized HRADF, however, ThPA has not yet been privatized. 
And yet, the commitment to privatize ThPA has already been institutionalized 
in Greek law (Hellenic Republic, 2012a). In this, ThPA’s transfer to HRADF was 
approved only by the Inter-ministerial Committee for Restructuring and Privatization 
(Hellenic Republic, 2011b, 2012b) and not by the Parliament Plenary. The trajectory 
of decision-making around the port is indicative of a wider transformation of Greek 
politics in the aftermath of the crisis. As Kioupkiolis writes “[t]he practice of state 
rule entered a zone of indistinction between law and fact, since de facto government 
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proceedings and decisions were converted into law and laws were increasingly 
stripped of any normative justification and were dictated by ‘necessity’  itself” (2014, 
page 147). Politics in the midst of the crisis became a task that is “too decisive and 
too sustained not to be left to the experts, to those who know how” (Rancière, 1999, 
page 113). The “‘expert state’ that follows strict economic necessity bec[a]me thus 
identified with ‘democratic form’” (Rancière, 1999, page 112). However, while the 
form of democracy survived, democratic accountability and power control were 
radically foreclosed. 
8 Conclusions 
This paper offered a reading of the neoliberal policies around Thessaloniki’s 
port over the past twenty years. Building on an understanding of neoliberalization as 
a performative discourse, it provided three insights around the reconfiguration of 
urban infrastructure politics in Greece. First, the paper charted the emergence and 
workings of a mutually reinforcing coupling between neoliberalization and 
modernization discourses. During the 1990s and 2000s modernization discourses 
have constructed neoliberal policies as ‘the modern’ alternative and fetishized the 
construction of urban infrastructures. Within this discursive landscape, successive 
failures in achieving the idealized end-state of neoliberalization policies  as well as 
existing infrastructural inadequacies were seen as failures to modernize, as a failure 
to follow ‘the path to Europe’. Consequently, such failures and inadequacies were 
re-inscribed in neoliberalization discourses. This logic reached its apogee in the 
aftermath of the ‘Greek crisis’ when the country’s failure to modernize was posited 
as the sole explanation for its current situation and served as the legitimizing ground 
33 
 
for yet another round of dogmatic neoliberal policies. Building on this discourse, 
performing neoliberalization was the central strategy in maintaining local and 
national state legitimacy. Throughout this process “proof of the right of state power 
[was] identical to the evidence that it only ever [did] the only thing possible, only 
ever what is required by strict necessity in the context of the growing intricacy of 
economies within the global market” (Rancière, 1999, pages 112-113). 
Second, the paper unearthed how successive rounds of neoliberalization 
have, through failing forward, reshaped urban infrastructure politics around the port 
in regenerative and accumulative ways. To begin with, the quasi-privatization reform 
of 1999 institutionalized market efficiency and financial assessment as the 
unquestionable guiding principles in producing and governing urban infrastructure. 
However, the role of the state was not diminished but rather re-organized around 
the construction of new techno-managerial elites closely linked with the country’s 
political elites. In the following years, urban infrastructures emerged as a prominent 
terrain for speculation and capital accumulation. Coupled with financial and banking 
deregulation, this strategy opened up urban infrastructures to investments by 
tycoons like Lavrentis Lavrentiadis, further subjugating their governance to 
speculative moves. Ultimately, this resulted in the consolidation of a close interplay 
between politico-managerial and economic elites in the country.  
Third, and related to the above, the most important effect of the successive rounds 
of neoliberal policies around the port was the gradual de-politicization of urban 
infrastructure politics. Discursively, the coupling of neoliberalization and 
modernization discourses proved a powerful strategy in portraying disagreement 
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towards ThPA’s privatization as a romantic and fundamentalist stance failing to 
understand what the ‘givens of the situation’ necessitate. Institutionally, the 1999 
reform and the 2008 effort to privatize the container terminal gradually reduced 
urban infrastructure politics to consensual negotiations between political and state-
appointed managerial elites and global and local capitals. In the aftermath of the 
crisis, the rule of capital and experts was further consolidated to incorporate the 
techno-managerial elites of the EU-IMF-ECB troika as well as a new host of state-
appointed expert consultants crystallized around the HRADF. Brought together these 
changes, the paper argued, have sought to move urban infrastructure governance 
beyond democratic accountability and foreclose the institutional and discursive 
spaces for the expression of democratic disagreement as well as the search for 
political alternatives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
References 
Alapis SA, 2008a, "Annual Report", (Alapis SA, Athens) 
Alapis SA, 2008b, "Corporate Anouncement - Participation in International competition 
12/05/2008",  (Alapis SA, Athens) 
Badiou A, 2008, The meaning of Sarkozy (Verso, London) 
Bourdieu P, 2002, “Against the policy of depoliticization” Studies in Political Economy 69 31-
41 
Brenner N, 2004, New State Spaces (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 
Brenner N, Peck J, Theodore N, 2010a, "After Neoliberalization?" Globalizations 73 327-345 
Brenner N, Peck J, Theodore N, 2010b, "Variegated neoliberalization: geographies, 
modalities, pathways" Global Networks 10(2) 182-222 
Brenner N, Theodore N, 2002, "Cities and the Geographies of “Actually Existing 
Neoliberalism”" Antipode 34(3) 349-379 
Brown W, 2006, "American Nightmare Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-
Democratization" Political Theory 34(6) 690-714 
Butler J, 1993 Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex (Routledge, London) 
Butler J, 2010, "Performative agency" Journal of Cultural Economy 3(2) 147-161 
Castree N, 2006, "From neoliberalism to neoliberalisation: consolations, confusions, and 
necessary illusions" Environment and Planning A 38(1) 1-6 
CEU, 1997, “Green Paper on seaports and maritime infrastructure” (Commission of the 
European Union, Brussels) 
CEU, 2004, “Proposal for a directive of the European Council and the European Parliament 
on market access to port services ((Commission of the European Union, Brussels) 
Christofilopoulou G, 1998, "Modernization winds for the ports " Economic Postman, 
24/12/1998, pages 62-63 
Cidell J, 2012, “Flows and pauses in the urban logistics landscape: the municipal regulation of 
shipping container mobilities” Mobilities 7(2) 223–245 
Cowen D, 2014, The deadly life of logistics (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis) 
Demertzis N, 1997, “Greece”,  in  European Political Cultures: Conflict or 
Convergence? Ed R Eatwell (Routledge, London) 
Diamandouros N, 1994, “Cultural Dualism and Political Change in Post-authoritarian Greece” 
Working paper no.50 (Instituto Juan March, Madrid) 
Diamandouros N, 2000, Cultural Dualism and Political Change in Post-authoritarian Greece 
(Alexandreia, Athens) 
Dikeç M, 2006, "Two decades of French urban policy: from social development of 
neighbourhoods to the republican penal state" Antipode 38(1) 59-81 
Douzinas C, 2013 Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis: Greece and the Future of Europe 
(Polity, Cambridge) 
England K, Ward K, 2007 Neoliberalization: States, Networks, Peoples (Blackwell, Malden 
MA) 
European Commission, 2011, "The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece Fourth 
review – spring 2011",  (European Commision, Brussels) 
Eurostat, 2002, “Country Profiles: Greece” (Eurostat, Brussels) 
Graham S, Marvin S, 2001 Splintering Urbanism (Routledge, London and New York) 
Hajer M, 2003, “Policy without polity? Policy analysis and the institutional void” Policy 
Sciences 36 175-195 
Hall P V, Jacobs W, 2012 “Why are maritime ports (still) urban, and why should policy-
makers care?” Maritime Policy & Management 39(2) 189-206 
Hatzidakis K, 2012, “Populism, the biggest opponent”, 
http://www.protagon.gr/?i=protagon.el.ellada&id=11990 
36 
 
Hellenic Parliament, 1996, “Minutes 10/10/1996” (Hellenic Parliament, Athens) 
Hellenic Parliament, 2008, “Minutes 08/02/2008” (Hellenic Parliament, Athens) 
Hellenic Parliament, 2010, “Minutes 11/06/2010” (Hellenic Parliament, Athens) 
Hellenic Parliament, 2011, “Minutes 04/08/2011” (Hellenic Parliament, Athens) 
Hellenic Republic, 1999, “Law 2688/99” (Hellenic Republic, Athens) 
Hellenic Republic, 2008, “Law 3654/2008” (Hellenic Republic, Athens) 
Hellenic Republic, 2011a, “Law 3986/2011” (Hellenic Republic, Athens) 
Hellenic Republic, 2011b, "Transfer to the company " Hellenic Republic Asset Development 
Fund" of government assets under the provisions of Law 3986/2011", (Hellenic Republic, 
Athens) 
Hellenic Republic, 2012a, "Law 4092/2012”,  (Hellenic Republic, Athens) 
Hellenic Republic, 2012b, "Transfer to the company "Hellenic Republic Asset Development 
Fund" of government assets",  (Hellenic Republic, Athens) 
Hesse M, 2013, “Cities and Flows: Re-Asserting a Relationship as Fundamental as it is 
Delicate” Journal of Transport Geography 29 33–42 
Hope K, 2009, "Who’s who: Big names in politics, business and culture" Financial Times, 
04/06/2009HRADF, 2011a, "The Fund", http://www.hradf.com/en/the-fund 
HRADF, 2011b, "OLP, OLTH, 10 Regional Ports", 
http://www.hradf.com/en/infrastructure/ports 
HRADF, 2012, "Asset Development Plan 3.0",  (HRADF, Athens) 
Imerisia, 2008, "ThPA: Reflections after the wreck with Hutchison" Imerisia, 29/12/2008 
Jaffee D, 2015, “A deeper channel floats all boats’: the port economy as urban growth 
engine” Environment and Planning A, 47(4) 783-800 
Kaika M, Swyngedouw E, 2000, "Fetishizing the modern city: the phantasmagoria of urban 
technological networks" International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 24(1) 120-138 
Kalli A, 2008, "ThPA - Hutchison looking for bank financing " Imerisia, 18/12/2008 
Karaman O, 2013, "Urban neoliberalism with Islamic characteristics" Urban Studies 50(16) 
3412-3427  
Kathimerini, 2013, "Thessaloniki's port will end up a peripheral point" Kathimerini, 
25/12/2013 
Kioupkiolis A, 2014, "Towards a regime of post-political biopower? Dispatches from Greece, 
2010–2012" Theory, Culture & Society 31(1) 143-158 
Koutsamparis F, 2008, “Port strike brings the market to its knees” Macedonia, 13/01/2008  
Labrianidis L, 2011, “Thessaloniki's Arrested Development: Missed Opportunities” Antipode 
43 1801-1827 
Laclau E, 1990 New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (Verso, London) 
Lampropoulos T, 2008, "They wanted a loan from Greece to buy ThPA " Eleftherotipia, 
27/12/2008 
Larkin B, 2013, “The politics and poetics of infrastructure” Annual Review of Anthropology 42 
327-343 
Lavrentiadis L, 2008, "Interview" To Vima, 18/05/2008 
Macedonian Press Agency, 2006, "Minister of Merchant Marine Manolis Kefalogiannis visits 
ThPA" Macedonian Press Agency, 02/09/2006 
Mathiopoulou M, 2008, “The strike in ThPA sinks businesses Macedonia, 23/04/2008 
McCarthy J, Prudham S, 2004, "Neoliberal nature and the nature of neoliberalism" Geoforum 
35(3) 275-283 
McFarlane C, Rutherford J, 2008, "Political Infrastructures: Governing and Experiencing the 
Fabric of the City" International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 32(2) 363-374 
Ministry of Mercantile Marine, 2002, "Strategy for a national ports policy",  (Ministry of 
Mercantile Marine, Piraeus) 
37 
 
Mitrakis Y, 2012, "Thessaloniki: ‘Secret’ meeting for the privatizations" Agelioforos, 
10/05/2012 
Mouffe C, 1993, The Return of the Political, (Verso, London) 
Mouffe C, 2005, On the Political. (Routledge, London) 
Municipality of Thessaloniki, 2005, "Development Strategy for Thessaloniki: Master Plan 
2006 - 2015" (Municipality of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki) 
Mylonas Y, 2008, "Industrial action at the port of Thessaloniki paralyzes business activity in 
Northern Greece " Union of Industrialists of Northern Greece Bulletin (Union of Industrialists 
of Northern Greece, Thessaloniki) 
Notteboom T, Rodrigue J.-P., 2012, “The corporate geography of global container terminal 
operators” Maritime Policy & Management 39 249-279. 
Pallis A, 2006, "Port governance in Greece" Research in Transportation Economics 17 155-
169 
Papachristou H, 2009, "Piraeus Bank sells its Proton stake for 70.7 mln eur", 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/30/piraeus-proton-sale-idUSATH00509220091230 
Papadakou Y, 2011, "How the Proton Bank scam was set up" To Vima, 10/11/2011 
Papandreou G, 2009, "The country's budget stalemate threatens our national sovereignty", 
http://papandreou.gr/%CF%84%CE%BF-
%CE%B4%CE%B7%CE%BC%CE%BF%CF%83%CE%B9%CE%BF%CE%BD%CE%BF%CE%BC%CE%
B9%CE%BA%CF%8C-%CE%B1%CE%B4%CE%B9%CE%AD%CE%BE%CE%BF%CE%B4%CE%BF-
%CF%84%CE%B7%CF%82-%CF%87%CF%8E%CF%81%CE%B1%CF%82-%CE%B1/ 
Peck J, 2011 Constructions of Neoliberal Reason (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 
Peck J, Theodore N, Brenner N, 2013, “Neoliberal urbanism redux?” International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research, 37(3) 1091-1099 
Plaskovitis E, 2000, "The third community support framework and the EU enlargement", in 
The New European Space Eds E Andrikopoulou, G Kafkalas (Themelio, Athens) 
Politis S, 1998, "The twelve steps for public corporations" Ta Nea, 03/06/1998 
Politis S, 1999, "The unbundling of corporations for their privatization" Ta Nea, 13/03/1999  
Port.Thess, 2013 Keep Walking (ThPA, Thessaloniki) 
Rancière J, 1999 Dis-agreement (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis) 
Reuters, 2012, "Special report: Greece claims magnate stole from his own bank" Reuters, 
12/01/2012 
Sevastakis N, 2004 Commonplace Country: Aspects of Public Space and value antinomies in 
contemporary Greece  (Savalas, Athens) 
Shaw J, Sidaway J, 2010, “Making links: on (re)engaging with transport and transport 
geography” Progress in Human Geography 35(4) 502–520 
Simitis C, 2010, “The cost of political clientelism” Kathimerini, 02/05/2010 
Sokou K, 2006, “The ammounts around corruption are unimaginable” To Vima, 12/11/2006 
Springer S, 2012, “Neoliberalism as discourse: between Foucauldian political economy and 
Marxian poststructuralism” Critical Discourse Studies 9(2) 133-147 
Stathakis G, 2010, "The sovereign debt crisis of the Greek economy: a historical view" 
Sychrona Themata 108 5-9 
Stavrakakis Y, 2007, The Lacanian Left (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh) 
Stavrakakis Y, 2013, "Dispatches from the Greek lab: Metaphors, strategies and debt in the 
European crisis" Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society 18(3) 313-324 
Stoker G, 1998, “Public–private partnerships in urban governance” in Partnerships in Urban 
Governance: European and American Experience, Ed J. Pierrre (Macmillan, Basingstone) 
Swyngedouw E, 2005, “Governance Innovation and the Citizen: The Janus Face of 
Governance-beyond-the-State” Urban Studies 42 1991-2006 
Swyngedouw E, 2006, “Circulations and metabolisms:(hybrid) natures and (cyborg) 
cities” Science as Culture, 15(2) 105-121 
38 
 
Swyngedouw E, 2009, “The Zero-Ground of Politics: Musings on the Post-Political City” 
NewGeographies 1 52-61 
Swyngedouw E, 2011, "Interrogating post-democratization: Reclaiming egalitarian political  
spaces" Political Geography 30(7) 370-380 
Ta Nea, 2001, "Premiere for ThPA's share in the Main Market" Ta Nea, 24/07/2001 
ThPA, 2004, 2004 Annual Report (ThPA, Thessaloniki) 
ThPA, 2005, Strategic Investment Plan (ThPA, Thessaloniki) 
ThPA, 2006, 2005 Annual Report (ThPA, Thessaloniki) 
ThPA, 2007, 2006 Annual Report,  (ThPA, Thessaloniki) 
ThPA, 2008a, 2007 Annual Report,  (ThPA, Thessaloniki)ThPA, 2008b, "Call for Bids for the 
Concession of Thessaloniki's Port Container Terminal",  (ThPA, Thessaloniki) 
ThPA, 2008c, "Table of Bids for the CT",  (ThPA, Thessaloniki) 
ThPA, 2008d, "Proclamation of an international open call for tenders for the concession the 
container terminal of ThPA S.A.", (ThPA, Thessaloniki) 
ThPA, 2017, “Port” online 
http://www.thpa.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=241&Itemid=981&la
ng=en  
To Vima, 2011, "Alapis files claim to enter article 99" To Vima, 24/10/2011 
Torrance M, 2008, “Forging glocal governance? Urban infrastructures as networked financial 
products” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 32(1) 1-21 
Tsakalotos E, 2010, "Contesting Greek Exceptionalism: the political economy of the current 
crisis",  (Mimeo University of Athens: Athens) 
Tziovas D, 1995, “The Western Fantasy of the Hellenic and the Quest for the Hyper-national” 
in Nation-State-Nationalism (Moraitis School, Athens) 
Wilson J, 2014, "The Shock of the Real: The Neoliberal Neurosis in the Life and Times of 
Jeffrey Sachs" Antipode 46(1) 301-321 
Žižek S, 2002, Revolution at the Gates (Verso, London) 
Žižek S, 2010, "A Permanent Economic Emergency" New Left Review 64 85-95 
